Change in tactics.
Phases of the Battle
The Battle of Britain was split into a group of key phases, of which the Germans launched offensives focusing on different points of attack, with differing targets. These all having different logistical aspects due to the change in strategic focus across some of the more differing phases.
Phase One, 26th June to 16th July
Scattered and limited day and night attacks and mine-laying sorties, directed mainly against ports and shipping and towns with aircraft factories.
Phase Two, 17th July to 12th August
Increasing and larger daylight attacks against shipping in the English Channel, ports along the South and East coasts and some coastal airfields, with increased night attacks against the West, Midlands, and East Coast, RAF facilities and the aircraft industry.
Phase Three, 13th August - 6th September
Large-scale daylight attacks against RAF airfields in South-East England, with the object of exhausting the RAF' ability to provide a defence. Night attacks continued.
Phase Four/Five, 7th September - 2nd October/3nd October - 31st October
Large-scale day and night attacks against London. Then leading to smaller scale daylight fighter-bombers attacks while large-scale night attacks continued mainly against London. This was also the start of what came to be called the 'Blitz' on the capital and against other cities and towns, which lasted until May 1941.
Consequences of the German change in tactics
With phase one being the initial precautionary phase, and phase two being a limited version of phase three, the changes through phases one to three could be seen as only being in the developmental process of the aerial offensive. No in depth or large tactical changes were made, it did not change the overall focus of the attacks, just varying aspects of the focus and changing of some of the logistics. They all focused on limiting aircraft production or damaging those already made, as well as bombing only civilian areas with a key strategic purpose. The whole offensive through phases one to three was set about on the key focus to make strides towards a situation in which operation sea lion could commence, or at least diminish the RAF to a point where they would be forced into surrender.
However the changes from phase three to four saw a significant and in depth change in the key focus of the offensive. It no longer sought to diminish Britain ability to defend itself via the RAF, or be a precautionary attack for the potential invasion of Britain. The new focus of the attack was solely an attempt to remove Britain from the war by inciting civilian pressure to end the war on the home front, they were trying to bomb Britain into submission. Phase five was just a continuation with slight logistical changes from phase four, focusing on night bombing, this point in time could even be perceived as the end of the battle of Britain itself and the beginning of the blitz, this highlighting the dire mistake of which he Germans made.
This key change was brought upon by a variety of reasons, leading to the overall shift in the tactical focus. On the 24th of August several off-course German bombers accidentally bombed central areas of London. Following this attack the next day, the RAF bombed Berlin for the first time. These attacks were seen by the Germans as indiscriminate due to their inaccuracy and failure to hit specific targets. This infuriated Hitler, and followed this up by ordering a counteroffensive in the form of a concentrated night offensive against the island, and especially London. This reiterated in a public speech in Berlin on 4 September 1940: The other night the English had bombed Berlin. So be it. But this is a game at which two can play. When the British Air Force drops 2000 or 3000 or 4000 kg of bombs, then we will drop 150 000, 180 000, 230 000, 300 000, 400 000 kg on a single night. When they declare they will attack our cities in great measure, we will eradicate their cities. The hour will come when one of us will break – and it will not be National Socialist Germany!- Adolf Hitler. This was proceeded by Goering planning, on the 3rd of September, to bomb London daily, with General Albert Kesselring's enthusiastic support, with little knowledge of how close they were to burying the RAF. Goering had overestimated British forces, and did not know how close he could have come to defeating the British despite the initial success in the change of tactics.
The German’s inability to use a systematic approach to defeat the RAF, by constantly changing and altering the objectives was key in the eventual loss and was mainly brought upon by Goering. This played into the hand of the British as although at many a times, they were weak in some areas, they were never fully destroyed or left incapable.The Germans' change of strategy was initially working well because their main aim, of drawing Fighter Command forces up for the final kill achieved. But from the British perspective, and stated by Churchill "If the enemy had persisted in heavy attacks against the adjacent sectors (airfields) and damaged their operations rooms or telephone communications, the whole intricate organization of Fighter Command might have been broken down. . . . It was, therefore, with a sense of relief that Fighter Command felt the German attack turn on to London on September 7th, and concluded that the enemy had changed his plan. Goering should certainly have persevered against the airfields . . . [By departing from the classic principles of war] . . . he made a foolish mistake." At this point (7 September and onwards), Fighter Command had been saved from defeat on the ground, as the airfields were given time to rebuild and recuperate. However the German strategy was actually working and the RAF could still be defeated in the air. Once they had changed into the night bombing mainly however this also changed. The respite experienced by the RAF airfields allowed the first break in over ten days for the pilots of 11 Group to stand down from conditions of constant readiness during the daylight hours. Long rests, provided a change in the state of fighter command from near exhaustion to a new liveliness and energy within the squadrons. That overall was to prove decisive in the air battles on 15 September, the day that is celebrated as Battle of Britain Day.
The change in key targets of the Germans, and their inability to destroy any of these left them attacks in the long run essentially redundant and was the key reason why Germany lost the battle of Britain in terms of tactics. Initially the German underestimation of radar was key in the retainment of that early warning system of which was vital in the air defense (as stated in defense systems tab, radar section) of which they were still able to utilize during the rest of the offensive. The break of which they gave fighter command on the ground was key in the running of airfields and the supply of resources such as planes, and the ability to prepare and repair them for active use. The final straw of which broke the camel's back was the rest they gave the pilots in early september and this time was vital in the rest of the battle, leading eventually to the loss in the offensive. If any of these were focused onto a full extent and fully destroyed the eventual outcome of the battle would have changed completely, possibly to the point of which Britain may have been removed from the war.
The impact was not fully limited to just the loss in the battle and offensive itself. Britain’s victory and it’s ability to stay in the war may have been one of, if not the most influential events in the war. The future attacks, conflicts as well as the multiple fronts are just some of a few key problems of which this would cause the Germans. This can also be seen as one of the key victories of which lead to the American involvement in the war also, as they could now rely on Britain to defend itself. One of the other more significant and long term impact of the loss, brought upon by the change in tactics was also the view of the Luftwaffe by German, people, pilots and commanders. It had overwhelmed opposition throughout Poland, the low countries and France building up quite a critical aclaim. In Britain for the first time the Luftwaffe had been defeated, this being a shattering blow to the once perceived invincible Luftwaffe. This pride lost by the German public, and prestige lost by pilots, brought an end to the infinite confidence Goering and his men. They undoubtedly lost most of their best pilots and aircrew, hindering their efficiency and effectiveness for the rest of the war, and thus overall could be perceived as the most shattering blow for the Luftwaffe in world war two.
With phase one being the initial precautionary phase, and phase two being a limited version of phase three, the changes through phases one to three could be seen as only being in the developmental process of the aerial offensive. No in depth or large tactical changes were made, it did not change the overall focus of the attacks, just varying aspects of the focus and changing of some of the logistics. They all focused on limiting aircraft production or damaging those already made, as well as bombing only civilian areas with a key strategic purpose. The whole offensive through phases one to three was set about on the key focus to make strides towards a situation in which operation sea lion could commence, or at least diminish the RAF to a point where they would be forced into surrender.
However the changes from phase three to four saw a significant and in depth change in the key focus of the offensive. It no longer sought to diminish Britain ability to defend itself via the RAF, or be a precautionary attack for the potential invasion of Britain. The new focus of the attack was solely an attempt to remove Britain from the war by inciting civilian pressure to end the war on the home front, they were trying to bomb Britain into submission. Phase five was just a continuation with slight logistical changes from phase four, focusing on night bombing, this point in time could even be perceived as the end of the battle of Britain itself and the beginning of the blitz, this highlighting the dire mistake of which he Germans made.
This key change was brought upon by a variety of reasons, leading to the overall shift in the tactical focus. On the 24th of August several off-course German bombers accidentally bombed central areas of London. Following this attack the next day, the RAF bombed Berlin for the first time. These attacks were seen by the Germans as indiscriminate due to their inaccuracy and failure to hit specific targets. This infuriated Hitler, and followed this up by ordering a counteroffensive in the form of a concentrated night offensive against the island, and especially London. This reiterated in a public speech in Berlin on 4 September 1940: The other night the English had bombed Berlin. So be it. But this is a game at which two can play. When the British Air Force drops 2000 or 3000 or 4000 kg of bombs, then we will drop 150 000, 180 000, 230 000, 300 000, 400 000 kg on a single night. When they declare they will attack our cities in great measure, we will eradicate their cities. The hour will come when one of us will break – and it will not be National Socialist Germany!- Adolf Hitler. This was proceeded by Goering planning, on the 3rd of September, to bomb London daily, with General Albert Kesselring's enthusiastic support, with little knowledge of how close they were to burying the RAF. Goering had overestimated British forces, and did not know how close he could have come to defeating the British despite the initial success in the change of tactics.
The German’s inability to use a systematic approach to defeat the RAF, by constantly changing and altering the objectives was key in the eventual loss and was mainly brought upon by Goering. This played into the hand of the British as although at many a times, they were weak in some areas, they were never fully destroyed or left incapable.The Germans' change of strategy was initially working well because their main aim, of drawing Fighter Command forces up for the final kill achieved. But from the British perspective, and stated by Churchill "If the enemy had persisted in heavy attacks against the adjacent sectors (airfields) and damaged their operations rooms or telephone communications, the whole intricate organization of Fighter Command might have been broken down. . . . It was, therefore, with a sense of relief that Fighter Command felt the German attack turn on to London on September 7th, and concluded that the enemy had changed his plan. Goering should certainly have persevered against the airfields . . . [By departing from the classic principles of war] . . . he made a foolish mistake." At this point (7 September and onwards), Fighter Command had been saved from defeat on the ground, as the airfields were given time to rebuild and recuperate. However the German strategy was actually working and the RAF could still be defeated in the air. Once they had changed into the night bombing mainly however this also changed. The respite experienced by the RAF airfields allowed the first break in over ten days for the pilots of 11 Group to stand down from conditions of constant readiness during the daylight hours. Long rests, provided a change in the state of fighter command from near exhaustion to a new liveliness and energy within the squadrons. That overall was to prove decisive in the air battles on 15 September, the day that is celebrated as Battle of Britain Day.
The change in key targets of the Germans, and their inability to destroy any of these left them attacks in the long run essentially redundant and was the key reason why Germany lost the battle of Britain in terms of tactics. Initially the German underestimation of radar was key in the retainment of that early warning system of which was vital in the air defense (as stated in defense systems tab, radar section) of which they were still able to utilize during the rest of the offensive. The break of which they gave fighter command on the ground was key in the running of airfields and the supply of resources such as planes, and the ability to prepare and repair them for active use. The final straw of which broke the camel's back was the rest they gave the pilots in early september and this time was vital in the rest of the battle, leading eventually to the loss in the offensive. If any of these were focused onto a full extent and fully destroyed the eventual outcome of the battle would have changed completely, possibly to the point of which Britain may have been removed from the war.
The impact was not fully limited to just the loss in the battle and offensive itself. Britain’s victory and it’s ability to stay in the war may have been one of, if not the most influential events in the war. The future attacks, conflicts as well as the multiple fronts are just some of a few key problems of which this would cause the Germans. This can also be seen as one of the key victories of which lead to the American involvement in the war also, as they could now rely on Britain to defend itself. One of the other more significant and long term impact of the loss, brought upon by the change in tactics was also the view of the Luftwaffe by German, people, pilots and commanders. It had overwhelmed opposition throughout Poland, the low countries and France building up quite a critical aclaim. In Britain for the first time the Luftwaffe had been defeated, this being a shattering blow to the once perceived invincible Luftwaffe. This pride lost by the German public, and prestige lost by pilots, brought an end to the infinite confidence Goering and his men. They undoubtedly lost most of their best pilots and aircrew, hindering their efficiency and effectiveness for the rest of the war, and thus overall could be perceived as the most shattering blow for the Luftwaffe in world war two.
For referencing and research sources and other information please look to the bibliography section.