Strategic purpose.
Long term reasons for offensive with Britain.
|
Hitler's pre-war perspectives on Britain
Hitler began to see Britain as a potential ally, though he did recognize that attaining this allegiance would be difficult. He held this opinion of Britain until he realised that it would not grant him the ability to launch his coveted offenses in Eastern Europe. Despite this he repeatedly stressed his ambition to come to terms with Britain, looking for non-discretion pacts as one of his favoured options. One of the last pre-war British ambassador to Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson, wrote during the second world war that Hitler “combined … admiration for the British race with envy of their achievements and hatred of their opposition to Germany’s excessive aspirations” (Henderson, N. (1940). Failure of a mission; Berlin 1937-1939. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.) This perspective was set to change, as stated in Hitler's Directive No. 16 On preparations for a landing operation against England: “Since England, in spite of her hopeless military situation, shows no signs of being ready to come to an understanding, I have decided to prepare a landing operation against England and, if necessary, to carry it out. The aim of this operation will be to eliminate the English homeland as a base for the prosecution of the war against Germany and, if necessary, to occupy it completely.” From this point onwards Hitler saw England as a threat and an enemy for a variety of reasons. He saw there opposition in the war creating a two front war which could hinder offensives in to the east. As well as this the possibility of England being able to draw America into the war was another key reason why they needed to be removed from the war from his perspective. After the capitulation of France, the declaration of Hitler’s Directive number 16, also ordered preparation for the potential invasion of England. This plan named operation Sea Lion was put into planning, and was seen initially as the next step forward to remove Britain from the war. The army drew up the first initial plan, with no regard for the logistical issues, of the navy and airforce. Thus the prerequisites were made for the attack, these being complete air superiority, the use of powerful artillery in the dover straights as well as minefields being laid to protect the potential invasion path. In the plan finalised in August 1940, the invasion force was organised into two army groups drawn from the 6th Army, the 9th Army and the 16th Army. The first wave of the landing would have consisted of eleven infantry and mountain divisions, the second wave of eight panzer and motorised infantry divisions and finally, the third wave was formed of six further infantry divisions. The initial assault would have also included two airborne divisions and the special forces of the Brandenburg Regiment. Although the German navy was opposed to these plans and did not know whether or not they would be able to fulfill their ability for the plan to succeed and thus the success and ability of the operation to even take place could be brought in question. The Reference book, Churchill, W. (1949). Winston Churchill, The Second World War (Vol. Their finest hour). London: The educational book company limited. Kippenberger Military Archive & Research Library, states the perspectives of German leaders and their clashes in terms of their perspectives on the possible invasion of Britain. These quarries were between General Halder head of the German navy and the German Army chiefs. Hadler and Goering both believed that operation Sea Lion would not need to take place and made this view very apparent with meetings with Hitler discussing the idea. The Navy gave its initial capabilities wanting a more narrow offensive, with a lesser risk of losing boats and allowing for a more stable. Although the army saw this as suicide once they had landed and were unable to launch the offensive in the tactical manner of which they wanted in the pincer style blitzkrieg movement. Thus, they the issue was took to Hitler and he decided that the armies plan was vital in the success of the land invasion. Hadler would follow this up with complaints about the logistics questioning whether or not the navy would be able to achieve their specific role for the invasion. Thus, we it can’t be certain whether or not that Operation Sea Lion would have taken place or that logistically the offensive would have been successful This was because not only the weather, but the British navy still would have made a considerable impact on the channel crossing. Finally Goering perspective that the a aerial victory would have ended the war against Britain itself as this would force them into surrender is another potential factor of which may have prevented operation sea lion from taking place. |
The specific need for the battle of Britain |
Adolf Hitler, Directive No. 17 (1st August, 1940)“The Luftwaffe will use all the forces at its disposal to destroy the British air force as quickly as possible. August 5th is the first day on which this intensified air war may begin, but the exact date is to be left to the Luftwaffe and will depend on how soon its preparations are complete, and on the weather situation.” As mentioned in Hitler’s 17th directive, the sole purpose of the battle of Britain, due to the logistical issues of operation Sea Lion, was to eliminate the RAF, to leave Britain in a point where they were vulnerable enough to be invaded or surrender due to their inability to defend themselves in the air. Operation Sea Lion needed this aerial superiority to get its troops across the channel and operate the Blitzkrieg, style of warfare once they had crossed. Thus, the sole and key purpose of the battle of Britain was to eliminate the RAF, so they would be able to launch and land invasion of England, to eliminate their threat from the rest of the war (if operation sea lion was able to take place).
|